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ABSTRACT
The Georgian and Ukrainian tax systems both emerged after the collapse of the USSR, 
yet the tax reforms in the two countries pursued different trajectories and produced 
different outcomes. The article systematizes and compares the results of the tax reforms 
in Ukraine and Georgia. The study applies qualitative methods for historical analysis, 
for periodization of the reforms and for classifying their key priorities and the factors 
that influenced them. Quantitative methods are applied to compare the tax burden in 
Ukraine, Georgia and OECD countries. The success and failure of the tax reforms was 
measured by the index of economic freedom (including its component – the index of 
tax burden). The first hypothesis suggested that a reduction in the tax burden had a 
positive impact on the indicators of economic freedom; the second hypothesis stated 
that a reduction in the tax burden affected fiscal freedom but did not affect the index of 
economic freedom. Regression dependences of the average tax burden (including the 
tax burden resulting from social security contributions) and the index of economic free-
dom (including the index of tax burden) were built in the R environment. The regres-
sion analysis confirmed the first hypothesis for Ukraine and the second, for Georgia. 
This result can be explained by the fact that, unlike Ukraine, the Georgian tax reforms 
focused on institutional changes, which determined their success. In 1996–2018, Geor-
gia rose in the ranking of economic freedom and joined the group of economically free 
countries. Moreover, this country has been steadily improving its position in the rank-
ing. Ukraine, on the contrary, has remained in the group of economically unfree coun-
tries. Due to the unbalanced reforms and insufficient structural changes, the country’s 
government failed to ensure the desired effect from the tax burden reduction 
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Становление и развитие налоговых систем Грузии и Украины имели одну 
отправную точку – распад СССР, но пути реформирования были разными, 
что повлияло на результаты реформ. Целью статьи является систематизация 
Economic issues of tax reforms
Экономические проблемы налоговых реформ
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и сравнительный анализ результатов налоговых реформ двух стран. Качествен-
ные методы исследования применены для исторического анализа и периодиза-
ции налоговых реформ в Украине и Грузии. Выявлены факторы и приоритеты 
налоговых реформ в исследуемых странах. Изменения налоговых систем струк-
турированы в соответствии с выделенными этапами. Количественные методы 
использованы для аналитического сравнения налоговой нагрузки в Украине, 
Грузии и странах ОЭСР. В качестве индикатора результатов налоговых реформ 
выбран индекс экономической свободы, и его составляющая – индекс налого-
вой нагрузки. Сформулированы две гипотезы: (1) снижение налоговой нагруз-
ки положительно отразилось на показателях экономической свободы; (2) сниже-
ние налоговой нагрузки повлияло на фискальную свободу, но не повлияло на 
индекс экономической свободы. С помощью программной среды R построены 
регрессионные зависимости средней налоговой нагрузки (включая налоговую 
нагрузку по взносам на социальное страхование) и индекса экономической сво-
боды (включая индекс налоговой нагрузки). Результаты регрессионного анали-
за показали, что для Украины подтвердилась первая гипотеза, для Грузии – вто-
рая. Полученный результат объясняется тем, что проводя налоговые реформы, 
Грузия, в отличие от Украины, сделала акцент на институциональных измене-
ниях в сфере налогообложения. Как результат, грузинские налоговые реформы 
оказались более успешными, и страна за период с 1996 по 2018 г. в рейтинге 
экономической свободы смогла подняться в группу экономически свободных 
стран и ежегодно повышать рейтинг в этой группе. Украина так и осталась 
в группе экономически несвободных стран, поскольку несбалансированность 
налоговых реформ, недостаточные институциональные и структурные измене-
ния не дали ожидаемого эффекта от снижения налоговой нагрузки
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
налог, налоговые реформы, налоговый коэффициент, налоговая нагрузка, ин-
декс экономической свободы
1. Introduction
The development of Ukrainian and 
Georgian statehood share one key charac-
teristic: after gaining independence, both 
countries launched a series of tax reforms. 
An important part of these reforms was 
reduction of the tax burden, which was 
initially seen as a way to enhance econom-
ic growth and at later stages, to curb the 
shadow economy. The reforms involved 
changes in the number and composition 
of taxes, in the tax base and tax rates, tax 
administration and so on. 
 In Ukraine, scarcely a year went by 
without some kind of improvements in 
the sphere of tax legislation or other relat-
ed fields. Eventually, such lack of stabil-
ity triggered a public discussion about the 
need to freeze the tax reform since it was 
hard for companies to keep up with the 
changes. It should be noted, however, that 
although such measure was considered 
to be necessary and even urgent, it nev-
er came to be realized. In the light of the 
above, the question arises as to how ad-
equate was the choice of the goals and pri-
orities of the Ukrainian reforms, whether 
they were really needed; whose interests 
they served; how efficient they were and 
what determined the change of priorities 
in the process of reformation. The tax re-
forms in Georgia can be considered to 
be more productive in comparison with 
Ukraine as they followed a more clearly 
defined set of priorities. 
In order to evaluate the outcomes of 
tax reforms and make conclusions about 
their success or failure, we should first look 
at the general state of the country’s econ-
omy. The tax climate shapes a number of 
indicators, including the dynamics of busi-
ness development, investment activity and 
rates of economic growth. It is practically 
impossible to analyze the impact of tax re-
forms on all the above-described indicators 
within one study. At the same time, the 
analysis of only one factor is not enough to 
gain a comprehensive and accurate picture. 
Therefore, for the purpose of our research 
we chose to use an aggregate indicator – 
the index of economic burden. 
This article aims to systematize and 
analyze the results of the tax reforms in 
Ukraine and Georgia and evaluate their 
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impact on the countries’ positions in the 
ranking of economic freedom. 
The article is structured the follow-
ing way: the introduction is followed by 
the review of the research literature on 
tax reform practices in OECD countries, 
Ukraine and Georgia. In the third section, 
we describe our research methodology 
and hypotheses. The fourth section focus-
es on the experience of tax reformation in 
Ukraine and the fifth, in Georgia. The last 
section contains conclusions and outlines 
prospects for further research. 
2. Literature review
Tax reforms can be considered from a 
variety of different approaches and angles. 
The choice of approaches largely depends 
on the differences in the development of 
national economies and, therefore, in the 
specific problems in the fiscal sphere that 
certain countries have to address. 
Western economists mostly seek to 
identify the weaknesses in the current 
taxation systems and search for ways of 
solving the existing problems. It should 
be noted that the majority of tax reforms 
in developed countries are aimed at mini-
mizing the negative impact of taxation on 
the key macro-indicators [see W. Gale and 
A. Samwick [1]). This study shows that re-
duced income tax burden can increase the 
productive capacity of businesses, which 
means that less government subsidies will 
be required. The connection between taxa-
tion and economic growth is discussed by 
W. McBride [2]. J. Antos and his colleagues 
highlight the connection between policy 
choices regarding state revenues and ex-
penditures and the impact of changes in 
taxation on economic growth, taking into 
consideration the time lag [3]. S. Barrios 
et al. [4] research the impact of taxation 
on decision-making in international firms 
concerning the location of their foreign 
subsidiaries. It should be noted that the 
problems of profit shifting to  low-tax 
jurisdictions and the resulting tax base 
erosion are widely discussed by interna-
tional researchers, who describe the pos-
sible reforms of tax systems to tackle these 
problems more effectively [5]. Another 
related question concerns the influence of 
taxation on inequality and the tax reforms 
needed to reduce inequality and the as-
sociated risks. For example, D.R. Agrawal 
and D. Foremny analyze how tax rates 
influence the choices of location made by 
high-income taxpayers [6]. A similar ques-
tion is raised in the study of K. Schmid-
heiny and M. Slotwinski [7]. The impact of 
tax reforms on the international mobility 
of inventors is considered in the study of 
U. Akcigit et al. [8]. F. Guvenen and his 
colleagues research the phenomenon of 
the tax base erosion caused by offshore 
profit shifting [9].
Another question that attracts a lot of 
scholarly attention is the impact of tax re-
forms on economic growth [10; 11] and the 
macro-economic equilibrium [12]. I. Ana-
niashvili and V. Papava [13–15] have dem-
onstrated how taxes influence economic 
activity and growth by applying the Laf-
fer-Keynesian synthesis. These studies 
explore the theoretical aspects of the re-
lationship between taxes and economic 
growth; they also use specific models to 
provide a comprehensive picture of how 
taxes affect economic growth through the 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand. 
Ananiashvili and Papava also investigate 
the analytical potential of the production 
function and of the behavioural approach-
es to estimating the impact of tax burden 
on the amount of total output and budget 
revenues. Such methodology makes it 
possible to determine the so-called fiscal 
points corresponding to the maximum 
production effect and the budget’s maxi-
mum tax revenues.
The goals pursued by reformers in 
developed countries are often similar, al-
though there may be different reasons for 
launching these reforms such as the wish 
to maintain the macro-economic equilibri-
um when dealing with political pressures 
or the search for optimal taxation mecha-
nisms to satisfy the fiscal needs of the state 
and the public. We should keep in mind 
that in developed economies, reforms are 
implemented in a transparent environ-
ment, with low corruption levels and high 
degrees of government accountability.
If we look at the latest publications 
focusing on the Ukrainian reforms, it be-
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comes evident that most of them choose 
to focus on specific aspects of these re-
forms. Some studies consider the problem 
of taxation in the light of Ukraine’s inte-
gration into the European space: for ex-
ample, A. Grechko [16], N. Noginov [17] 
and V. Ilyashenko [18]. Another group 
of studies considers the anti-crisis aspect 
of the tax reforms, for example, V. Mel-
nik and T. Koschuk [19], Y. Turyansky 
[20]. A. Borzenkov [21], T. Paientko and 
K. Proskura [22], and V. Oparin [23] in-
vestigate the outcomes of the reforms. 
Also notable are the series of fundamen-
tal studies on various aspects of taxation 
published by Y. Ivanov and I. Mayburov 
[24–26]. 
As for the reforms in Georgia, 
Bakhtadzae et al [27], Kemularia [28], Ko-
paleishvili et al [29] and Meskhia [30] ana-
lyze the history of these reforms, their key 
aspects and the gradual improvements of 
taxation mechanisms. Chikviladze [31], 
Terashvili [32], Uridia [33] and Veruli-
dze [34] explore the possibilities for the 
improvement of the tax administration 
technology. Bedianashvili [35], Gaga-
nidze [36] and Silagadze [37] investigate 
the goals of the tax reforms, the institu-
tional transformations of the tax system 
and the ways of ensuring the compliance 
of the taxation system with the European 
standards. Stimulation of economic and 
entrepreneurial activity are the questions 
addressed by Bedianashvili [38], Papava 
[39], Shevardnadze et al [40], Silagadze et 
al [41; 42], Zubiashvili, et al [43; 44].
Although there is vast research lit-
erature on various aspects of tax reforms, 
little attention has been given to the domi-
nant factors that determined the course of 
the tax reforms in Ukraine and Georgia. 
The tax reforms in Ukraine, for example, 
are impeded by the high level of corrup-
tion, low information transparency and 
the lack of government accountability. 
These factors create resistance among the 
taxpayers and curb the reforms’ impact on 
the country’s economic performance. The 
tax reforms in Georgia go hand in hand 
with the gradual decrease in corruption, 
higher levels of information transparen-
cy and the government’s accountability. 
Thus, in comparison with Ukraine, the 
Georgian reforms produce more tangible 
results regarding the relationship between 
taxpayers and fiscal institutions. They also 
have a visible positive impact on the key 
areas of the country’s economy. 
3. Methodology
The theoretical part of our study em-
ploys the historical and systems methods. 
We apply the historical method to pro-
pose a periodization of the tax reforms in 
Ukraine and Georgia. The systems meth-
od was used to describe the structure of 
the changes in the respective tax systems 
at specific stages; together with the infer-
ence method, it also helped identify the 
factors and priorities of the tax reforms.
In the empirical part of the study, we 
compare the tax burden in the given coun-
tries and their OECD counterparts and 
evaluate the impact of the tax reforms on 
Ukraine’s and Georgia’s progress in the 
ranking of economic freedom. 
The calculations were made with the 
help of the R environment. The databases 
for calculations were downloaded from 
the OECD1 and World Bank’s2 official 
web-sites. 
In our study, we considered the fol-
lowing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. The reduced tax burden 
in Ukraine and Georgia had a positive im-
pact on the indices of economic freedom.
Hypothesis 2. The reduced tax burden 
affected the fiscal freedom but did not af-
fect the index of economic freedom.
At the first stage of our study, we con-
ducted a statistical analysis of the tax bur-
den in OECD countries. OECD countries 
were included in the sample because their 
tax systems are relatively harmonized. 
Due to the lack of data, we didn’t include 
in the sample Australia (no data for 2017) 
and Japan (no data before 1995). The sam-
ple covers the period from 1995 to 2017. 
At the second stage, we built regres-
sion dependences of the mean tax burden 
(including social security contributions) 
1 h t t p s : / / s t a t s . o e c d . o r g / v i e w h t m l .
aspx?datasetcode=REV&lang=en#
2 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
GC.TAX.YPKG.RV.ZS?view=chart
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and the index of economic freedom (in-
cluding the index of tax burden). 
We used tax burden as an indepen-
dent variable since the tax reforms in 
Ukraine and Georgia prioritized its re-
duction. 
We chose the index of economic free-
dom and the index of tax burden as de-
pendent variables. The index of economic 
freedom is an integral indicator character-
izing the level of economic freedom for 
business development in a given country. 
To measure the level of economic freedom 
in a country, we need to look not only at 
certain characteristics of its tax system 
(tax burden and fiscal freedom) but also 
at the institutional characteristics, such 
as property rights protection, freedom 
from corruption, investment and financial 
freedom, and so on. Depending on their 
scores, countries are assessed and divided 
into the following groups: 
– free countries, with the index values 
between 80 and 100;
– mostly free, 70–79.9;
– moderately free, 60–69.9;
– mostly unfree, 50–59.9;
– and repressed, 0–49.9. 
The index of tax burden characterizes 
the degree of the tax system’s impact on 
the ease of doing business in a specific 
country. Values of this index may vary 
between 0 and 100. The higher is the in-
dex, the more attractive this country is for 
business. 
4. Tax reforms in Ukraine
A brief historical overview of taxation 
in Ukraine is necessary in order to gain 
a better understanding of the problems 
Ukrainian reformers were trying to ad-
dress. Originally, the Ukrainian tax legis-
lation had a two-level structure: there was 
the General Law on the Taxation System 
and laws for specific taxes such as the 
VAT, corporate income tax, personal in-
come tax and so on. The General Law on 
the Taxation System (revised in 1991, 1994 
and 1997) determined the structure of the 
tax system and defined the general prin-
ciples of taxation. Since 2011, the tax leg-
islation has been codified. In 2015, the Tax 
Code was substantially amended. 
Such instability of the tax legislation 
can be explained by the influence of ob-
jective and subjective factors. One of the 
main objective factors was that the coun-
try lacked the necessary experience re-
quired for the formation of the attributes 
of its statehood, in particular the tax sys-
tem. At the current stage of economic de-
velopment, the structure of tax systems 
in different countries is more or less the 
same, which is particularly true for the 
range of taxes and mechanisms of taxa-
tion in EU countries. Therefore, in the ab-
sence of its own experience, Ukraine could 
benefit from the experience of developed 
countries. Some adjustments had to be 
made, however, regarding the country’s 
peculiar needs and specificities in order 
to build an efficient, reliable and stable tax 
system. Even though tax systems of dif-
ferent countries share the same principles, 
no two systems are identical. Therefore, it 
would have been far-fetched to hope for 
easy solutions when creating a tax system 
in Ukraine. 
The subjective factors included the 
low quality of the draft laws and the over-
hasty adoption of these laws. For example, 
the draft Tax Code was presented for the 
first reading at the Verkhovna Rada in 
2000, after that it got stuck in the approval 
process which lasted until 2010, when the 
government had to rush through the third 
version of the law. According to V. Opa-
rin and T. Paientko, each new government 
in Ukraine, including the current one, 
launched its own tax reforms, which in-
vites a supposition that the government’s 
prime concern is not about the efficiency 
of the tax system and the quality of the tax 
legislation but about lobbying its own in-
terests [23]. 
The high tax burden is generally con-
sidered to have been one of the major 
drawbacks of the Ukrainian tax system 
throughout its development. Therefore, 
the first question we need to answer here 
is whether the tax burden in Ukraine is re-
ally that high or not. The level of tax bur-
den is measured as a percentage of GDP 
and by comparing tax rates for the key 
taxes. Since the question about whether 
to include social contributions into the tax 
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burden or not still remains open, we shall 
compare the tax burden (as a ratio of tax 
revenues to GDP) in Ukraine and OECD 
countries (see Tables 1–2, Figure 1). For 
Ukraine we considered the period starting 
from 2004, when the necessary informa-
tion was first made publicly accessible. 
The graph in Figure 1 shows that the 
share of tax revenues in GDP was the 
smallest in 2004 and the highest in 2012. 
The mean value in the given period is 
36.35%. Table 1 and 2 show the results 
of the statistical analysis of tax burden in 
OECD countries.
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Figure 1. Share of tax revenues in GDP of Ukraine in 2004–2017, %
Source: constructed by the authors on the basis of the World Bank data
Table 1
Descriptive statistics on tax revenues in OECD countries in 1995–2017, % of GDP, by year
Year mean sd min q1 median q3 max IQD
1995 33.402 8.543 10.110 29.330 35.136 39.317 46.499 9.988
1996 33.737 8.433 9.912 29.472 34.601 39.226 47.372 9.753
1997 33772 8.351 10.500 30.037 34.690 3.511 48.321 7.474
1998 33953 8.229 10.963 30.933 34.157 37.418 48.426 6.485
1999 34.172 8.157 11.728 31.069 34.505 37.973 48.804 6.904
2000 34.104 7.955 11.462 30.850 33.492 38.109 48.984 7.260
2001 33.594 7.663 12.194 29.583 32.867 37.566 46.832 7.983
2002 33.342 7.563 12.610 29.537 33.239 37.358 45.405 7.822
2003 33.261 7.498 12.671 29.197 33.143 37.441 45.583 8.244
2004 33.187 7.696 11.559 29.227 33.596 37.328 46.393 8.101
2005 33.662 7.756 11.362 29.541 33.791 38.850 48.005 9.309
2006 33.807 7.493 11.588 30.181 34.140 39.718 46.462 9.536
2007 33.853 7.306 12.014 30.119 34.220 39.274 46.425 9.155
2008 33.269 7.208 12.599 29.428 32.597 38.751 44.765 9.323
2009 32.588 7.589 12.467 29.077 31.468 38.760 44.963 9.682
2010 32.682 7.331 12.840 28.238 32.167 37.364 44.756 9.126
2011 32.960 7.255 12.767 28.022 32.768 36.900 44.793 8.878
2012 33.391 7.558 12.649 28.402 32.267 3.384 45.512 9.982
2013 33.673 7.618 13.304 29.043 33.493 38.207 45.888 9.164
2014 33.877 7.684 13.704 29.512 33.344 38.236 48.531 8.723
2015 33.985 7.363 15.933 29.743 33.470 38.094 46.132 8.350
2016 34.779 7.861 16.634 30.601 33.984 39.117 51.595 8.516
2017 34.479 7.258 16.174 30.797 34.304 38.727 46.231 7.930
Source: calculated by the authors on the basis of the OECD data
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As Table 1 illustrates, the mean tax 
burden tended to grow – from 33,402% in 
1995 to 34,479% in 2017. The same trend 
was demonstrated by the minimum val-
ues of the tax burden (16.174% in 2017). 
The maximum value of the tax burden 
reached its peak in 2016 and in 2017 
dropped to 46.231%. The median value of 
the tax burden is close to the mean value.
Table 2 shows the results of descrip-
tive statistics for the same period and for 
the same countries included in the sample. 
We see that Ukraine has no abnormal de-
viations from the global trend in what 
concerns tax burden: in the given period 
its tax burden remained within the range 
of 21.86–32.06% (net of pension contribu-
tions) and 29.75–39.29% (including pen-
sion contributions).
The tax burden in Ukraine is below 
average among OECD countries and is 
at approximately the same level as that 
of the Czech Republic, Germany, Iceland, 
Holland, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia. 
Therefore, the opinion that the tax burden 
in Ukraine is high appears ungrounded. 
Ukraine can thus be described as a coun-
try with a medium level of tax burden.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics on tax revenues in OECD countries in 1995–2017,  
% of GDP, by country
Year mean sd min q1 median q3 max IQD
AUT 42.076 0.991 40.408 41.195 42.233 42.704 43.886 1.509
BEL 43.569 0.788 42.370 43.081 43.451 44.083 45.106 1.062
CAN 33.056 1.605 30.875 31.791 32.766 34.473 35.912 2.682
CHL 19.784 1.310 17.334 18.943 19.591 20.554 22.710 1.611
CZE 33.571 0.795 32.283 33.177 33.454 34.224 34.893 1.047
DNK 46.247 1.028 44.756 45.547 46.189 46.720 48.531 1.172
EST 32.347 1.596 29.969 31.192 31.667 33.519 36.033 2.327
FIN 43.170 1.472 40.788 42.073 43.333 44.138 45.820 2.064
FRA 43.523 1.297 41.528 42.409 43.334 44.304 46.231 1.895
DEU 35.654 1.059 33.860 34.948 35.574 36.316 37.544 1.368
GRC 32.741 3.014 27.890 30.803 31.982 34.901 39.386 4.098
HUN 38.070 1.115 36.250 37.313 37.950 38.828 40.776 1.514
ISL 36.097 4.220 31.187 33.998 35.592 37.142 51.595 3.144
IRL 28.470 2.652 22.837 27.358 28.458 30.796 32.268 3.437
ISR 32.931 1.823 29.834 31.221 33.331 34.308 35.421 3.087
ITA 41.305 1.532 38.583 40.165 41.668 42.228 44.050 2.063
KOR 22.873 2.278 19.118 21.620 23.391 24.617 26.900 2.998
LVA 28.861 1.065 27.466 27.950 28.646 29.470 31.222 1.520
LTU 29.298 1.662 26.966 27.965 29.203 30.152 32.758 2.187
LUX 32.067 1.018 34.850 36.502 37.325 37.632 38.654 1.130
MEX 12.511 1.765 9.912 11.511 12.467 12.803 16.634 1.293
NLD 36.243 1.110 34.804 35.515 36.047 37.027 38.752 1.512
NZL 32.613 1.705 30.055 31.572 32.313 33.816 36.058 2.245
NOR 41.047 1.420 38.228 40.024 41.850 42.059 42.831 2.035
POL 33.404 1.638 31.199 32.010 32.940 34.383 36.617 2.373
PRT 31.601 1.658 29.278 30.290 31.247 30.073 34.708 1.783
SVK 32.185 3.222 28.075 29.258 32.179 33.263 39.562 4.005
SVN 36.878 0.611 36.021 36.406 36.822 37.263 38.360 0.857
ESP 32.944 1.538 29.708 32.014 33.077 33.593 36.358 1.579
SWE 45.269 2.111 42.506 43.588 45.174 46.724 48.984 3.136
CHE 26.819 0.685 25.519 26.507 26.882 27.016 28.456 0.509
TUR 23.368 2.382 16.390 23.104 23.592 25.017 25.899 1.914
GBR 31.966 1.105 29.311 31.504 32.283 32.705 33.258 1.201
USA 25.919 1.464 23.017 24.782 25.975 27.049 28.202 2.266
Source: calculated by the authors on the basis of the OECD data
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The tax-to-GDP ratios for the key tax-
es in Ukraine are also far from being the 
highest: for instance, the corporate income 
tax-to-GDP ratio is even lower than in 
many OECD countries (see Table 3). 
The corporate income tax-to-GDP 
ratio in Ukraine is lower than in Estonia, 
where the corporate income tax was re-
placed by the tax on withdrawn capital. It 
should be noted that the Ukrainian gov-
ernment has been continuously declaring 
that stimulation of business and attrac-
tion of investment are its top priorities, 
although no significant reduction in the 
profit tax rates ever ensued. The corporate 
income tax rate was reduced very slowly 
and, therefore, had no visible effect either 
on taxpayers or the country in general. 
Effective corporate income tax rates in 
all the given countries are lower than nom-
inal due to the tax benefits and tax prefer-
ences applied for certain transactions. In 
the majority of these countries both the 
nominal and effective corporate income 
tax rates are higher than in Ukraine, which 
clearly disproves the common miscon-
ception about the high level of corporate 
taxation in Ukraine. The corporate income 
tax-to-GDP ratio in Ukraine is lower than 
the average in the OECD sample. In some 
countries, such as Ireland, Switzerland 
and Germany, the corporate income tax 
rates are lower than in Ukraine but the fis-
cal significance of this tax is higher, which 
can be related to the mechanisms of pro-
viding tax preferences or the level of the 
shadow economy. In the given countries, 
this level on average does not exceed 20% 
while in Ukraine, according to the Minis-
try of Economic Development and Trade, 
in the first quarter of 2017, this level was 
37%3. This indicator is even higher if we 
look at the estimates of the World Bank, 
which show that in the last five years the 
level of the shadow economy in Ukraine 
hovers around 50–60%. This level has a 
negative impact on the fiscal efficiency of 
taxes due to tax evasion. 
The situation with the VAT in Ukraine 
is a bit different (see Table 4). 
The Table shows the data on the 
VAT-to-GDP ratio. As Table 4 shows, in 
Ukraine the VAT-to-GDP ratio in 2015 
was higher than in other countries while 
in 2016 it was not much different from the 
mean value in the sample. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that the Ukrainian state 
adopted a more harmonized procedure 
for refunding the VAT and cut the delays 
in VAT refunds. The nominal VAT rate 
in Ukraine is quite moderate, lower than 
in Germany, Turkey and Switzerland. In 
3 Shadow Economy in Ukraine. Avail-
able at http://www.me.gov.ua/Documents/
List?lang=uk-UA&id=e384c5a7-6533-4ab6-b56f-
50e5243eb15a&tag=TendentsiiTinovoiEkonomiki
Table 3
Corporate income tax-to-GDP ratio in OECD countries in 2010–2016, % 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Corporate income tax 
rate in 2018, %
Austria 9.67 9.67 9.72 9.79 9.97 10.36 9.42 25.00
Czech Republic 2.98 2.98 2.96 3.05 3.13 3.20 3.20 19.00
Estonia 3.37 3.21 3.44 3.75 3.94 4.20 4.17 20.00
Germany 8.03 8.29 8.73 8.78 8.73 8.95 9.32 29.89
Hungary 1.19 1.12 1.19 1.07 1.40 1.57 1.93 9.00
Ireland 8.88 8.87 9.19 9.22 9.37 8.00 8.07 12.50
Italy 10.55 10.14 10.70 10.72 10.20 9.98 9.86 24.00
Latvia 0.98 1.40 1.62 1.62 1.54 1.60 1.70 20.00
Poland 1.95 2.02 2.08 1.77 1.75 1.84 1.85 19.00
Slovakia 2.46 2.41 2.36 2.86 3.28 3.70 3.78 21.00
Switzerland 17.60 17.26 16.39 16.00 15.66 15.84 15.79 21.15
Turkey 1.80 1.94 1.85 1.60 1.58 1.43 1.65 22.00
UK 8.55 8.67 8.16 7.99 7.76 7.83 8.14 19.00
Sample mean 6.00 6.00 6.03 6.02 6.02 6.04 6.07 20.12
Ukraine 3.73 4.18 3.96 3.78 2.57 1.97 2.54 18.00
Georgia 2.88 2.78 3.42 3.25 3.01 2.84 3.22 15.00
Source: calculated by the authors on the basis of the data of the OECD and the World Bank.
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almost all of the given countries, the effec-
tive VAT rate is lower than the nominal, 
which can be explained by the fact that 
reduced VAT rates are applied to certain 
groups of commodities. It should be noted 
that the given countries do not experience 
any significant fluctuations in the VAT-to-
GDP ratio, which signifies a relative stable 
level of taxation in these countries. An 
increase in the VAT-to-GDP ratio in the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia stems 
from the gradual increase in the basic VAT 
rate by 1–2 percentage points. 
In order to estimate the tax burden in 
Ukraine by looking at specific taxes and 
tax payments, we need to conduct a ret-
rospective analysis of the tax policy. The 
reduction of the tax burden involved cut-
ting the number of taxes and fiscal charges 
as well as lowering the tax rates. There is 
a widely shared misconception about the 
excessive number of taxes in Ukraine. 
However, each round of tax reforms in 
this country included eliminating some of 
the taxes, which usually happened when 
the Tax Code was adopted or amended. 
As a rule, these were the taxes of second-
ary importance or those that produced lit-
tle revenue. A really important matter was 
the cancellation of contributions to differ-
ent special budget funds, in particular 
those that created a substantial tax burden 
such as the “Fund for the Liquidation of 
the Consequences of the Chernobyl Disas-
ter”, “Social Security Fund”, “State Innova-
tion Fund”, and the “Fund for Road Con-
struction and Repair”. These funds were 
created in large numbers in the first year 
of Ukraine’s independence (apart from the 
above-mentioned, there were also funds 
for the development of energy sector, con-
version, and so on). Currently the most sig-
nificant is only the contribution to the Fund 
of Social Security of the Disabled (the con-
tribution to this fund equals the amount of 
the annual salary at the rate of the mini-
mum wage per person). Companies have a 
choice of either hiring a disabled person or 
paying a fine for failing to fulfil the quota 
for employment of people with disabilities. 
Therefore, the contributions to this fund 
are in fact the fines paid by companies fail-
ing to hire disabled people. 
At the initial stage in the development 
of the country’s tax system (1991–1997), 
the key priority was to establish a tax sys-
tem which would be able to ensure stable 
budget revenues. Although at this stage 
the fiscal function prevailed, some steps 
were taken to reduce the tax burden. 
The rates were reduced for the key 
taxes: first, the VAT rate was lowered from 
28% to 20% in 1995, which was a bold de-
cision considering the level of budget defi-
ciency at that time. It should be noted that 
there was an attempt to set the VAT rate 
Table 4
VAT-to-GDP ratio in OECD countries in 2010–2016, %
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 VAT rate, %
Austria 6.45 6.28 6.27 6.13 6.07 6.07 6.16 20.00
Czech Republic 6.65 6.86 7.05 7.41 7.41 7.25 7.41 21.00
Estonia 8.54 8.18 8.41 8.23 8.66 9.20 9.36 20.00
Germany 5.62 5.55 5.55 5.41 5.32 5.39 5.42 19.00
Hungary 8.54 8.41 9.13 8.91 9.24 9.64 9.29 27.00
Ireland 5.09 4.72 4.79 4.67 4.83 3.67 3.76 23.00
Italy 4.69 4.57 4.46 4.32 4.40 4.45 4.45 22.00
Latvia 6.70 6.77 7.17 7.40 7.55 7.70 8.15 21.00
Poland 7.59 7.83 7.14 7.04 7.13 6.99 7.05 23.00
Slovakia 6.19 6.67 5.95 6.33 6.60 6.87 6.67 20.00
Switzerland 4.93 4.83 4.71 4.60 4.42 4.24 4.20 8.00
Turkey 5.39 5.64 5.20 5.57 5.02 5.18 5.01 18.00
UK 4.25 4.81 4.74 4.69 4.68 4.71 4.74 20.00
Sample mean 5.33 5.28 5.25 5.12 5.10 4.93 4.97 ...
Ukraine 7.97 9.88 9.85 8.82 8.87 9.02 5.88 20.00
Georgia 10.64 11.46 11.60 10.63 11.30 11.02 9.67 18.00
Source: constructed by the authors on the basis of the data of the OECD and the World Bank.
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at 20% in 1993 but it proved too hard to 
retain the rate at this level and it had to be 
raised after only four and a half months. 
At the same time the rates of the busi-
ness taxes were lowered: initially the cor-
porate income tax rate (net profit) was set 
at 35%. In 1992–1994, the system of busi-
ness taxation changed several times: the 
income tax (the sum of commercial profit 
and the wage fund minus gross income) 
had the rate of 18%; in 1994 it was raised 
to 22%; later this tax was replaced by the 
corporate income tax with the rate of 30%. 
Finally, the government decided to set the 
profit tax rate at 30%. 
During the years of Ukrainian sover-
eignty, taxation of physical persons also 
underwent significant changes: at first 
there was a “citizen income tax” but later 
it was renamed into the “tax on the in-
come of physical persons”; the tax rates 
and mechanisms of taxation were also ad-
justed multiple times. The situation was 
particularly volatile in the early 1990s. 
Until 2003, Ukraine had had a progressive 
tax scale, also changed three times. 
The second stage (1997–2000) involved 
the development of tax regulation and har-
monization of the main taxes with interna-
tional norms. In 1997, the principles of VAT 
and corporate income tax collection were 
revised, and the principles of VAT collec-
tion were harmonized with those of West-
ern countries. As for the corporate income 
tax, the reform resulted in the separation 
of bookkeeping from tax accounting and 
the object of taxation – profit – started to be 
calculated differently from the way profit is 
calculated in bookkeeping. 
Introduction of a simplified taxation 
system for small business, which stimu-
lated entrepreneurship and self-employ-
ment, was one of the positive aspects of 
the tax regulation in this period. 
At the third stage of the reforms (2000–
2010), policy-makers were searching for 
the right balance between the fiscal and 
regulating function of taxes, for example, 
they liquidated excessive VAT benefits 
and corporate income tax benefits. In the 
same period, the progressive personal in-
come tax scheme was replaced by a pro-
portional scheme. From 2004 to 2007, the 
proportional tax rate in Ukraine was 13%, 
and in 2007 it was raised to 15%. One of 
the most significant results of the reforms 
in this period was the adoption of the law 
“On the Procedure for Payment of Taxpay-
ers” Liabilities to Budgets and State Pur-
pose Funds’ of 21.12.2000 № 2181. This law 
systematized approaches to tax liability 
settlement and to application of penalties 
for violating the tax legislation. Principles 
of penalizing taxpayers changed consider-
ably, moreover, the grounds for imposing 
penalties were expanded and the size of 
penalties became dependent on the type of 
tax check and the kind of violation. 
The fourth stage (since 2011 to pre-
sent) involved codification of the tax leg-
islation, simplification of the tax system 
and its further harmonization with the EU 
legislation. The search for ways to further 
reduce the tax burden continues.
At this point we should emphasize that 
among other taxes in Ukraine, the VAT is 
most harmonized with the EU legislation. 
If we compare the current VAT rate in 
Ukraine with that of other countries, we 
can notice that in general it corresponds to 
the international norms. Therefore, the de-
bates about the VAT now mostly focus on 
its administration and collection. It should 
be noted, however, that all EU countries, 
except for Denmark, apply reduced VAT 
rates to some pharmaceutical products, 
food necessities, public transport fees, 
periodicals and so on. In Ukraine, the re-
duced VAT rate is applied only to phar-
maceutical products and medical equip-
ment (7%), which does not qualify as a 
reduction of the tax burden since before it 
was introduced, medical drugs and equip-
ment had been VAT-free.
Changes in the approaches to the VAT 
administration in Ukraine raise a number 
of questions. Overall, however, the intro-
duction of the electronic VAT administra-
tion system in 2015 helped the authorities 
minimize the risks of fictitious tax credits 
and simplify the process of declaration 
and payment of the VAT. On the other 
hand, the majority of firms offering their 
customers deferred payment terms faced 
difficulties when they were trying to regis-
ter their tax invoices in the electronic sys-
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tem while shipping the products. In order 
to register a tax invoice, it is necessary to 
have the corresponding sum of money on 
the taxpayer’s account in the Treasury Ser-
vice. For example, if you need to register 
a tax invoice for the sum of 120,000 hryv-
nias, including the VAT of 20,000 hryv-
nias, the remaining amount on the taxpay-
er’s electronic account should be 20,000 
hryvnias. This remaining amount consists 
of the VAT amounts in the tax invoices 
registered by the company’s suppliers, the 
VAT amount paid to import goods, the 
money transferred by the taxpayer, and 
the monthly average of the VAT amounts 
declared by the taxpayer in the last 12 fis-
cal months and discharged (or amortized/
deferred). If the sum on the taxpayer’s ac-
count is not enough, the taxpayer has to 
transfer funds from their current bank 
account (you cannot, however, withdraw 
funds back from your taxpayer’s account) 
to avoid paying a fine for delayed registra-
tion and losing a customer since without 
the registered tax invoice, the customer 
loses their right to the tax credit. The pur-
pose of the electronic system is to prevent 
VAT fraud and evasion due to fictitious 
tax credits but this system also hampers 
efficient operation of companies. 
The introduction of the system in 
2015–2016 did not help the government 
solve the problem of timely VAT refunds 
on exported goods. The situation got bet-
ter only in 2017, when the register of com-
panies claiming the VAT refund became 
publicly open. Before 2017, such registers 
had been closed, which led to high risks of 
corruption associated with “queue jump-
ing”. When the registers became open, 
the transparency of the “queuing system” 
also became higher as the companies were 
now able to keep track of the process.
Another problem taxpayers faced 
in 2017 was that the system blocked the 
registration of tax invoices if it detected a 
high level of risk of a fictitious transaction. 
Sometimes this mechanism created ab-
surd situations: for instance, tax invoices 
of a manufacturing enterprise got blocked 
because the system did not have the infor-
mation that this production had already 
been bought by this enterprise before. 
The confusion and uproar among tax-
payers led to a large number of suits filed 
against the State Fiscal Service. As a result, 
the Ministry of Finance had to revise the 
criteria for blocking tax invoices. The im-
provement of the electronic system is still 
a work in progress. 
As for the corporate income tax, its rate 
was gradually lowered: in 2005–2010 the 
tax rate was 25%. In accordance with the 
Tax Code of 2010, it was planned to lower 
the tax rate to 23% in 2011; to 21% in 2012; 
to 19% in 2013; and to 16% in 2014. These 
plans were never fully realized and at the 
moment the corporate income tax rate is at 
the level of 18%. Thus, since Ukraine be-
came an independent state, the tax rate has 
been lowered almost twofold. Compared 
with international experience, this rate is 
generally on a par with that of other post-
Socialist countries but significantly lower 
than that of developed countries. 
In addition to the above, the tax bur-
den was also lowered due to the changes 
in corporate income taxation: since 2015, 
taxable income has been defined as the fi-
nancial result calculated according to the 
national bookkeeping standards and inter-
national accounting standards (depending 
on the conceptual framework this or that 
company should apply). Thus, the finan-
cial result calculated in the way described 
above is further adjusted for tax differ-
ences defined in Tax Code of Ukraine. 
The main tax differences are those related 
to the depreciation of non-current assets; 
financing transactions; and provisions for 
incurred and probable expenses. This ap-
proach does not contradict the existing 
international practice but, on the contrary, 
is methodologically close to it. In Ukraine, 
however, this change caused conflicts be-
tween taxpayers and tax authorities. What 
in fact happened is that since 1997, tax ac-
counting has prevailed over bookkeeping, 
which remained relevant only for compa-
nies subject to mandatory audits and thus 
required to publish their financial reports 
(issuers of securities, financial institutions 
and public joint-stock companies). 
The personal income tax can be consid-
ered less harmonized. Since 2007, the rate 
of the personal income tax was 15% and in 
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2011, a second rate of 17% was introduced 
for higher income individuals. In 2016, the 
unified proportional rate was raised to 18%. 
At the same time, the unified social security 
contribution was cancelled for employees. 
Such instability in tax legislation may sig-
nify a lack of the clear strategic and tacti-
cal vision behind the tax reforms. There is 
also a perceptible lack of agreement among 
the policy-makers as to what direction the 
reform should take: for example, high-
income groups now enjoy a lower level of 
taxation while disadvantaged groups, on 
the contrary, have to struggle with higher 
taxation levels. In comparison with other 
countries, Ukraine has the lowest level of 
personal income tax in the world. The ma-
jority of countries have fixed progressive 
tax schedules. In Western Europe, the tax 
burden on personal income is reduced con-
siderably through tax deductions and tax 
rebates. First of all, in almost all countries 
there is a tax-exempt minimum income, 
which either equals or slightly exceeds the 
minimum wage. In Ukraine only a limited 
number of people can take advantage of 
the full scope of tax benefits. 
Secondly, Western states strive to pro-
mote self-employment and, therefore, of-
fer self-employed citizens an opportunity 
to deduct their home office expenses and 
the expenses of operating their personal 
vehicles for business against their self-
employment income, thereby reducing 
their income tax. To claim self-employed 
tax benefits citizens don’t have to be reg-
istered as entrepreneurs. In Ukraine, how-
ever, there is no such option. 
The current practice of personal in-
come taxation in Ukraine is inconsistent 
with the government’s intention to stimu-
late the development of non-state pension 
schemes. The only incentive available in 
Ukraine is the right to claim a tax relief 
and even in this case there is a limit on the 
amount of pension contributions on which 
you get a tax relief. In many EU countries, 
for example, Germany, France and the 
UK, the governments stimulate contribu-
tions to private pension plans by incentiv-
izing the employer and the insured. For 
instance, in the progressive income tax 
system, physical persons are entitled to a 
higher tax threshold or to a tax relief on 
their pension contributions. 
The last step towards reduction of the 
tax burden in Ukraine was cutting the rate 
of the unified social contribution for enter-
prises. While previously it varied between 
36.76% to 49.7% of the salary budget de-
pending on the occupational hazard class, 
in 2016 the rate was reduced by more than 
a half – to 22%. Much had been said about 
the need for such a measure long before it 
was actually taken: one of the arguments 
was the experience of development coun-
tries, where the average rate of social secu-
rity contributions is 18–20%. Nevertheless, 
such comparisons are flawed since the ma-
jority of the countries where this rate is ap-
plied have funded pension systems while 
in Ukraine there is a PAYG system. As V. 
Oparin and T. Paientko point out, it is more 
effective to combine lowering of the unified 
social tax rate with a more radical reform of 
the pension system, which, unlike the one 
of 2017, is more likely to lead to fundamen-
tal improvements. Furthermore, many tax-
payers had to face a significant expansion 
of the tax base through the unified social 
tax, which included most of the compensa-
tion payments (for example, compensation 
for rent payments) [23]. 
Let us try to evaluate the results of 
the tax burden reduction in Ukraine. The 
reform of the mid-1990s, which involved 
lowering the VAT rate and elimination of 
contributions to special budgetary funds, 
brought more or less positive effects. These 
measures allowed the government to sta-
bilize the decline in the GDP growth rate 
and ensure some sort of macro-economic 
stability. In the early 2000s, the country 
finally achieved economic growth. Un-
doubtedly, the tax burden reduction made 
a substantial contribution to this success, 
even though it was not the sole factor. 
It is much harder, however, to evalu-
ate the impact of the transition from pro-
gressive personal income taxation to pro-
portional taxation. The rationale behind 
this transition was the need to deal with 
the problem of unreported income and 
tax evasion and thus to encourage busi-
ness to move from the shadow sector to 
the formal economy. Proponents of this 
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reform argued that such transition would 
boost tax revenues even with lower tax 
rates. As practice showed, however, no 
breakthrough was made in this respect 
and the problem of tax evasion remained 
unsolved and even got worse when the 
need to replenish the Pension Fund arose. 
On the other hand, no slump in tax rev-
enues ensued either. In the following two 
years, the tax revenues grew considerably: 
from 34800.00 billion hryvnias to 45900.00 
billion in 2008. These were the years of 
economic boom in Ukraine and although 
we cannot deny the positive impact of 
the reduced tax burden, the crucial factor 
was the growth of GDP, which becomes 
evident if we look at the personal income 
tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. 
This figure doesn’t change much: in 2003, 
it was 5.1%; in 2004, 3.8%; in 2005, 3.9%; 
in 2006, 4.2%; in 2007, 4.8%; and in 2008, 
4.8%. Undoubtedly, reduced income tax 
rates stimulated consumption and thus 
enhanced economic growth. Not all in-
come groups benefited the same from this 
reform, though, with the rich gaining the 
most. Reduced tax rates could be expected 
to raise investment, which would signify 
the success of the personal income tax re-
form. The reform, however, did not bring 
about the expected investment boom and 
it is unlikely to happen in the nearest fu-
ture. The reduction in the corporate profit 
tax rate was primarily aimed at encourag-
ing investment (at least according to the 
official version of the previous Ukrainian 
government). The officials insisted that 
the proposed tax incentives would result 
in an unprecedented inflow of investment, 
which, however, did not happen. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
reform failed to bring the desired result 
(or maybe it had been doomed to failure 
from the start). According to the studies of 
E&Y, PwC, and the World Bank, the main 
factor in foreign investors’ decision-mak-
ing is not the profit tax rate but the pro-
tection of their property rights, the rule of 
law and the efficiency of the government. 
According to the Heritage Foundation, 
in these indicators Ukraine’s position re-
mains steadily low. As for the integral 
indicator, Ukraine ranks among the eco-
nomically unfree countries4, such as Af-
ghanistan, Sudan, Angola, Suriname and 
Bolivia. Therefore, it is essential that the 
changes in the sphere of taxation should 
be accompanied by the complementary in-
stitutional transformations; otherwise the 
benefits from the reform will be enjoyed 
only by a small privileged circle of those 
who lobby these changes in the first place 
while the general level of public welfare 
will remain basically the same. Figure 2 il-
lustrates the dynamics of the index of eco-
nomic freedom and tax burden. 
4 Index of economic freedom. Available at: 
https://www.heritage.org/index/
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Figure 2. Dynamics of the index of economic freedom and the index 
of tax burden for Ukraine in 1996–2000
Source: constructed by the authors on the basis of the Heritage Foundation data
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As the graph above shows, the posi-
tion of Ukraine in the ranking of economic 
freedom leaves much to be desired. Even 
though its index grew from 40.6 to 51.9, it 
is still not enough for Ukraine to move to 
the next group in the ranking. As Figure 2 
illustrates, after 2002, the index of tax bur-
den grew considerably, which means that 
the tax reforms had a positive impact on 
the tax climate in the country.
As it was previously noted, the index 
of economic freedom is one of the integral 
indicators characterizing the country’s 
economic and institutional development. 
To evaluate the influence of tax reforms 
on economic freedom, we constructed two 
dependences with two dependent vari-
ables – the index of economic freedom (in-
tegral indicator) and the index of tax bur-
den (component of economic freedom). 
Tax burden (the share of tax revenues in 
GDP) was used as an independent vari-
able. The sample covers the period from 
2008 to 2018. The results of our calcula-
tions are shown in Table 5.
Table 5
Regression statistics results (Ukraine)
Linear Model
Dependent Variable
IEF index of eco-
nomic freedom)
TB (Tax 
burden)
0.218**
(0.073)
0.477**
(0.168)
Observations 11 11
R2 0.499 0.474
Adjusted R2 0.443 0.415
Residual Std. 
Error (df = 9)
0.388 0.894
F Statistic 
(df = 1; 9)
8.952** 8.107**
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
The F-statistic and p-value show the 
significance of these models. The coeffi-
cient of determination (adjusted to take 
into account the sample size) for the 
dependence of the index of economic 
freedom/tax burden is 0.443; for the de-
pendence of the index of tax burden/
tax burden, 0.415. In 2008–2018, the tax 
reforms targeted at reducing the tax base 
determined more than 40% of the dynam-
ics of the country’s economic freedom 
index. Therefore, for Ukraine the first 
hypothesis is confirmed and the second 
hypothesis is refuted. It should be noted 
that although in the given period the re-
duction of the tax burden was one of the 
priorities of the country’s fiscal policy and 
had a positive impact on the index of eco-
nomic freedom, Ukraine still remained in 
the group of economically unfree coun-
tries, that is, the impact of the reform was 
smaller than expected. 
5. Tax reforms in Georgia
Although the establishment and de-
velopment of the tax system in Georgia 
had the same point of departure as in 
Ukraine – the demise of the USSR, their tax 
reforms took different paths and brought 
different results, which, among other 
things, affected the general level of tax 
burden (Figure 3). As Figure 3 shows, tax 
revenues accounted for the smallest share 
in GDP in 2010 and the largest, in 2012. 
Figure 3 shows only one graph because in 
2008, social contributions and the personal 
income tax were united into one tax.
The mean value in the given period is 
23.51%. The tax burden in Georgia in the 
given period is below the average level in 
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Figure 3. The share of tax revenues in GDP of Georgia in 2008–2018
Source: constructed by the authors on the basis of the data of the Ministry of Finance of Georgia
Journal of Tax Reform. 2019;5(2):107–128
121
ISSN 2412-8872
the OECD (Tables 1–2); the average level 
of tax burden in Georgia is closer to that of 
Korea, Turkey and the USA. It should be 
noted that in these countries the level of 
tax burden is much lower than in the EU. 
The same can be said about the cor-
porate income tax- and the VAT-to-GDP 
ratios (see Tables 3 and 4). While the cor-
porate income tax rate is lower in Georgia 
(15%), its tax collection efficiency is higher 
than in Ukraine (which has become partic-
ularly evident since 2014) (Figure 4). The 
situation is similar for the VAT: while the 
tax rate is lower (18%), the efficiency of the 
VAT collection in Georgia is higher than 
in Ukraine (Figure 5). 
As Figure 4 illustrates, the corporate 
income tax-to-GDP-ratio in Ukraine was 
falling between 2011 and 2015 but went 
up in 2016. The dynamics of the corporate 
income tax-to-GDP-ratio in Georgia was 
less turbulent: in the period between 2012 
and 2015, it demonstrated a slight down-
ward trend and in 2016, increased insig-
nificantly. 
There were no dramatic fluctuations 
of the VAT-to-GDP ratio for Georgia in 
the given period; there was a decrease in 
2013 and 2016. Overall, the VAT-to-GDP 
ratio in Georgia was almost twice the 
OECD average, which can be explained by 
the shifting of the tax burden from income 
to consumption.
Building market economy, Georgia 
faced a number of political, economic and 
social problems, which made it necessary 
to create a robust tax system. Establishing 
a new tax system that would be suitable 
for market economy, in its turn, required a 
legislative foundation. During the transi-
tion period, the parameters of the tax sys-
tem remained largely unclear and there 
was no proper regulatory framework, 
which cuased some mistakes in the fol-
lowing tax reforms. In December 1993, the 
Georgian Parliament passed a legislative 
package (eight laws) aimed to improve 
the tax systems by stimulating entrepre-
neurship and mobilizing state budget re-
sources. The main law in this package was 
the Law of the Republic of Georgia “On 
the Principles of the Tax System”, which 
described organization of the tax system, 
methodological framework for the forma-
tion of taxes, levies, duties, and local taxes. 
The law “On the State Tax Service of the 
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Republic of Georgia” defined the rights 
and obligations of taxpayers in relation 
to the corresponding tax bodies. Accord-
ing to this law, tax authorities exercise 
control over businesses in the sphere of 
tax compliance to ensure a permanent 
inflow of funds to the state budget. This 
law provided a foundation for the devel-
opment of the state tax structure in Geor-
gia. It stipulates that the integral system 
of taxation service in Georgia comprises 
the central tax administration office, state 
tax inspections in autonomous republics, 
120 cities and districts. Units on all levels 
of this hierarchy represent legal entities 
with the corresponding attributes. Despite 
some serious drawbacks, the first Tax 
Code adopted by the Georgian Parliament 
on 13 June 1997 played a positive role in 
establishing the country’s tax system. In-
consistencies and incoherences within the 
Tax Code curbed its effectiveness and its 
impact on the operation of the tax sys-
tem. Hundreds of amendments to the Tax 
Code failed to produce the desired effect 
either. Neither taxpayers nor tax collec-
tors were willing to take into account the 
interests of the state and of the national 
economy. According to T. Kopaleishvili 
and M. Chikviladze, the Tax Code was not 
adjusted to the national traditions and not 
only failed to improve the tax relations but 
also led to the deterioration of the newly 
created tax system in Georgia [29]. 
The first Tax Code defined the ap-
plicability of the law, the types of taxes 
and their corresponding rates, the condi-
tions and deadlines for tax declaration, 
the rights and obligations of tax authori-
ties and taxpayers. The Code, however, 
did not define the type of control and the 
mechanism for ensuring obligations to tax-
payers. At later stages, the Tax Code was 
revised and amended until it was fully re-
placed by another one. The first Tax Code 
comprised 21 taxes, which had a negative 
impact on taxpayers. Moreover, the taxes 
failed to perform their fiscal function. In 
fact, the Georgian tax system of this peri-
od was typical of countries with transition 
economies: it was characterized by the di-
versity of taxes and excessive complexity 
of tax administration.
The multiple improvements to the 
Tax Code, however, had no influence on 
the tax environment. Therefore, a new tax 
code was created, which came into force on 
1 January 2005. It significantly reduced the 
number of taxes (from 21 to 6 – 5 national 
and 1 local) and simplified the mechanisms 
of tax administration. Thus, the Tax Code 
established a robust legal framework and 
set mechanisms for maintaining control 
over taxation, including supervision over 
taxpayers and guidelines for resolving 
tax disputes. The Code also described the 
rights and obligations of tax authorities and 
taxpayers, measures of service and control, 
rules of tax administration, and so on. 
The main goals of the tax reforms in 
Georgia were to simplify the tax system 
and tax administration, reduce the tax 
burden and ensure a more even distribu-
tion of the tax burden, remove the infeasi-
ble tax benefits and reduce the tax burden 
on economy as a whole. 
We should emphasize that as the 
shadow economy was shrining, the tax 
base was expanded, which compensated 
for the lost budget revenues due to the 
lowered tax rates. The tax reform also 
had some indirect positive effects. For 
instance, the liberalization and simplifi-
cation of the tax system together with the 
enhanced security of taxpayers had a posi-
tive influence on the investment climate in 
Georgia and helped move the capital into 
the formal sector.
The general view is that the tax re-
forms in Georgia went through three main 
stages. At the first stage, in 2004–2007, the 
tax reform involved profound institution-
al changes, lifting of bureaucratic barriers, 
substantial reduction of the tax burden 
(15 types of taxes were eliminated, and for 
some taxes, the rates were lowered), and 
reduction of the government’s involve-
ment into the activities of companies. 
The reform set simple and fair “rules of 
the game” and the state guaranteed to all 
economic and business entities that these 
rules would be observed. In this period, 
customs and tax bodies became subordi-
nate to the Ministry of Finance [35]. 
The very concept of the tax reform 
in Georgia has been thoroughly revised 
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since 2004: first of all, it was important 
to ensure the principle of tax neutrality, 
which means that taxes should not af-
fect the choices made by entrepreneurs 
concerning their fields of activity and in-
vestment. This principle is known to be 
successfully implemented in developed 
countries. On the other hand, it soon be-
came obvious that at that stage of its so-
cio-economic development, when Geor-
gia was going through serious structural 
transformations and was struggling with 
economic instability, the realization of 
the neutrality principle was problematic. 
Georgia was unable to fully adopt the ex-
perience of developed Western countries, 
which differed significantly in their levels 
of socio-economic development and the 
amounts of property people had as well 
as in people’s attitudes towards taxation. 
On the other hand, there was no denying 
the obvious: any country’s economic per-
formance is heavily dependent on its tax 
system. In Georgia, the fiscal policy and 
the tax system were primarily oriented to-
wards the fiscal function of taxation as the 
state budget needed a steady inflow of tax 
revenues. At first sight such fiscal policy 
seems to be realistic and acceptable but 
one has to take into account the fact that if 
the policy focuses only on the fiscal func-
tion of taxes to the detriment of the regu-
lating function (paying attention to opti-
mal tax rates and lowering them in certain 
sectors of economy), such situation will 
eventually lead to the shrinking tax base 
and share of taxes in budget revenues, 
although an increase in the absolute vo-
lumes of tax revenues is also possible [24]. 
The tax reform in Georgia started 
bringing positive results from the very 
first years of its realization. Its main suc-
cess factor was that special attention was 
given to the human factor and the incen-
tive scheme applied to the staff of the tax 
administration. L. Bakhtadzae et al. make 
a valid point saying that the Georgian 
government started the reform by trans-
forming the incentive scheme rather than 
by reducing the tax rates [27]. At the be-
ginning of this stage, the tax service went 
through some major restructuring, which 
involved layoffs and staff replacements. 
At the same time some policy measures 
were taken to combat corruption in the tax 
administration and to enhance the exper-
tise and qualification of tax officials. As a 
result, the tax revenues grew from 1530.2 
million lari in 2004 to 3669.0 million lari 
in 2007. In the same period the VAT rev-
enue rose from 661.4 million lari to 1973.7 
million. Along with the growth in the total 
tax revenue, the share of taxes in the coun-
try’s GDP increased from 12.1% in 2005 to 
21.6% in 2007 (according to the data of the 
Ministry of Finance of Georgia – www.
mof.ge). Remarkably, none of the other 
post-Soviet states demonstrated such an 
impressive upward dynamics in the per-
formance of their tax systems in this pe-
riod. Another important positive aspect of 
the reform is that at the first stage, the tax 
burden was reduced by lowering the tax 
rates, for instance, the VAT rate decreased 
from 20% to 18%; the income tax rate, 
from 20% to 12%; and the social tax, from 
33% to 20% (and later to 15%). In the fol-
lowing stages, the income and social taxes 
were united into one unified income tax, 
with the rate of 25%, later lowered to 20%.
The Georgian tax reform had a com-
prehensive character as the liberalization 
of taxes, resulting in tax cuts, continued 
throughout all its stages. At the second 
stage between 2007 and 2009, the institu-
tional structure of the tax system was im-
proved and new bodies of the tax admin-
istration were formed, causing a reduction 
in the tax burden. The institutional trans-
formation involved the creation of the 
Tax Revenue Service and some significant 
changes in the structure of the tax admin-
istration, including modernization of the 
technical facilities of customs checkpoints 
of the Central Tax Service. As we observed 
above, in 2008 the profit tax rate was low-
ered considerably – from 20% to 15%. The 
social tax and personal income tax were 
united into one tax. Industrial zones and 
warehouses were made exempt from taxes. 
The third stage of the reforms, which 
began in 2010–2011 and apparently still 
continues, encompasses deep and com-
plex transformations of the tax policy. In 
this period the customs reform was com-
pleted. Moreover, the use of innovative 
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digital technologies allowed the govern-
ment to cut the expenses for the protection 
of the tax legislation. The new tax code 
adopted at this stage was more compliant 
with the internationally accepted method-
ology and standards. New tax regimes for 
small and medium-sized enterprises were 
introduced in order to enhance entrepre-
neurship in the country. Some bureau-
cratic barriers were lifted. Digitization of 
customs administration allowed the gov-
ernment to simplify and harmonize cus-
toms procedures. 
M. Chikviladze points out that as a re-
sult of the tax reform, the number of taxes 
was reduced from 21 to 6 and the tax rates 
were lowered significantly for all the key 
taxes. Potential tax revenues of 40–45% of 
GDP dropped to 28–30% while the level of 
the actual tax revenues grew from 15.6% 
to 23.4%. At the same time the extent of 
compliance with tax obligations increased 
from 35% to 78–85% [31].
In the recent decades, Georgia has 
improved its investment climate consid-
erably. The creation of an efficient tax 
system with low tax rates and convenient 
and secure payment methods contributed 
to this process because it encourages tax 
compliance and stimulates entrepreneur-
ship. The success of the tax reform helped 
the government combat corruption more 
effectively, and now Georgia stands out 
favourably in this respect among other 
post-Soviet and developing countries. Ac-
cording to the “Corruption Perceptions 
Index” of 2019, which assessed financial 
transparency in 180 countries, Georgia 
ranked 41st in the world and occupied the 
top position among the 19 countries of 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA)5. 
Georgia used tax reforms to lower its 
tax rates, which was a crucial part of the 
country’s fiscal policy. According to the 
estimates of international organizations, 
Georgia now has comparatively low tax 
rates and offers comfortable conditions 
for business: in the joint study “Paying 
Taxes 2018” by the World Bank (WB) and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Georgia 
5 Corruption perception index. Available at: 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/
corruption_perceptions_index_2017
ranks 22nd among 190 countries in terms of 
the ease of paying taxes. This indicator is 
calculated by using three parameters – the 
number of taxes in the country (the num-
ber of payments); the average number of 
hours annually spent by a company to pay 
the taxes (the time to comply); and the to-
tal tax and contribution rate or the cost of 
all taxes borne as a percentage of the com-
pany’s commercial profit6.
The World Bank’s report “Doing Busi-
ness 2019” positively evaluated the out-
comes of the Georgian tax reforms7. The 
corporate profit tax scheme adopted on 
1 January 2017 exempts from income taxa-
tion undistributed profits, which, there-
fore, can become a source of reinvestment. 
The reform led to a reduction in the over-
all tax burden as a percentage of the prof-
it – 9.9%, which is by 6.5 percentage points 
lower than the level of the previous year. 
The same can be said about the time to 
comply, which fell by 49 hours (from 269 
to 220), resulting in Georgia’s 16th place in 
this indicator. 
As a result of its tax reforms, Georgia 
managed to move up the ranking of eco-
nomic freedom (Figure 6). 
As Figure 6 illustrates, between 1996 
and 2018, Georgia was steadily improv-
ing its performance in the ranking of 
economic freedom and moved from the 
group of economically unfree countries 
to the group of economically free coun-
tries (since 2013). The index of tax burden 
in the given period dropped by 5 points, 
which seems a natural outcome of the tax 
reform, aimed not only at reducing the tax 
burden but also at transforming the insti-
tutional tax environment.
To evaluate the impact of the tax re-
forms on economic freedom, we con-
structed two dependences with two de-
pendent variables – the index of economic 
freedom (integral indicator) and the index 
of tax burden (component of economic 
freedom). Tax burden (the share of tax 
6 Paying taxes. Available at: https://www.
pwc.com/gx/en/paying-taxes/pdf/pwc_
paying_taxes_2018_full_report.pdf
7 Doing Business. Available at: https://do-
ingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/
media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2019-re-
port_web-version.pdf
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revenues in GDP) was used as an inde-
pendent variable. The sample covers the 
period from 2008 to 2018. The results of 
our calculations are shown in Table 6.
Table 6
Regression statistics results (Georgia)
Linear Model
Dependent Variable
IEF index of eco-
nomic freedom)
TB (Tax 
burden)
0.411
(0.378)
0.816
(0.602)
Observations 11 11
R2 0.116 0.170
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.077
Residual Std. 
Error (df = 9)
0.607 0.968
F Statistic  
(df = 1; 9)
1.187 1.839
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
As Table 6 illustrates, the model is 
statistically insignificant as the F-statistic 
is 1.187 and 1.839 respectively while the 
minimum required value is 2 for the given 
number of degrees of freedom. The coef-
ficients of determination are low for both 
models, which signifies the absence of re-
lationship between the tax burden and the 
index of economic freedom. This can be 
explained by the fact that the tax reforms 
in Georgia were oriented towards institu-
tional changes, in particular improvement 
of tax administration. The second prior-
ity was the reduction of the tax burden. It 
should be noted that these priorities en-
sured Georgia’s transition from the group 
of economically unfree countries to the 
group of countries with high levels of eco-
nomic freedom (ranking positions 70–79). 
Thus, for Georgia the first hypothesis is re-
futed while the second is confirmed. 
6. Conclusion
The results of our study have shown 
that Ukraine went through four main 
stages of the tax reforms. At the initial 
stage (1991–1997), the key priority was 
to establish a tax system which would 
be able to ensure stable budget revenues. 
Although at this stage the fiscal function 
prevailed, some steps were taken to re-
duce the tax burden. At the second stage 
(1997–2000), tax regulation was developed 
and the main taxes were harmonized with 
international norms. At the third stage 
(2000–2010), the government tried to bal-
ance the fiscal and regulatory functions 
of taxes. The fourth, ongoing stage (since 
2011) involved codification of the tax leg-
islation, simplification of the tax system 
and its further harmonization with the EU 
legislation. The search for ways to reduce 
the tax burden continues. 
In Georgia, the tax reforms comprised 
three stages. The first stage (2004–2007) 
was the period of profound institutional 
changes, lifting of bureaucratic barriers, 
reduction of the tax burden (15 kinds of 
taxes were eliminated and some of the tax 
rates were lowered), reduced government 
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in Georgia in 1996–2018
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intervention into business activities. At the 
second stage (2007–2009), the institutional 
structure of the tax system was improved 
and new tax administration bodies were 
formed, resulting in an actual reduction 
in the tax burden. At the third, ongoing 
stage, the tax reform has been completed 
while the tax policy is still undergoing 
profound transformations. Moreover, 
modern digital technologies have enabled 
the government to cut the spending on the 
protection of the tax legislation. 
In Ukraine, the resulting tax system is 
characterized by a moderate tax burden 
(compared with OECD countries), while 
in Georgia, the tax burden is quite low. 
The tax burden on corporate profits in 
Ukraine and in Georgia is lower than in 
the OECD. Due to the successful institu-
tional transformations in Georgia, its cor-
porate income tax-to-GDP-ratio is higher 
than in Ukraine although the nominal rate 
is higher in Ukraine. The VAT-to-GDP ra-
tio in Ukraine and Georgia is higher than 
in OECD countries while the efficiency 
of the VAT collection is higher in Geor-
gia than in Ukraine. The tax reforms in 
Ukraine lacked a clear strategy and tactics, 
which led to some unpredictable results. 
Furthermore, in Ukraine institutional 
changes always tended to recede into the 
background while the priority was given 
to the reduction of the tax burden and the 
struggle against tax fraud and tax evasion. 
In Georgia, the key priority of the tax re-
forms was not just to reduce the tax bur-
den but to balance the interests of the state 
and taxpayers through structural changes 
in the sphere of tax administration. There-
fore, the Georgian tax reforms turned out 
to be more successful: between 1996 and 
2018, the country rose in the economic 
freedom ranking to the group of economi-
cally free countries and has been steadily 
improving its position. Unlike Georgia, 
Ukraine has remained in the group of 
economically unfree countries due to its 
unbalanced reforms, insufficient institu-
tional and structural changes. Therefore, 
these factors prevented the country’s pol-
icy-makers from ensuring the desired ef-
fect from the tax burden reduction.
Future research should include a more 
in-depth comparative analysis of the tax 
reforms in Ukraine and Georgia, focusing 
on the key taxes. 
References
1. Gale W. G., Samwick A. A. Effects of Income Tax Changes on Economic Growth. Economic 
studies at Brookings. 2014;(1):1–15. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2494468
2. McBride W. What Is The Evidence on Taxes and Growth. Special Report No. 207. Washington, 
D.C: The Tax Foundation; 2012.
3. Joseph A., Biggs A., Brill A., Viard A. Tax and spending reform for fiscal stability and 
economic growth. AEI Economic Perspectives. May, 2015. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710963
4. Barrios S., Huizinga H., Laeven L., Nicod`eme G. International taxation and multinational 
firm location decisions. Journal of Public Economics. 2012;(96):946–958.
5. Jametti M., Redonda A., Sen A. The power to pass on taxes: a test for tax shifting based on 
observables. CESifo, Working Paper no. 4265; 2013.
6. Agrawal D. R., Foremny D. Relocation of the Rich: Migration in Response to Top Tax 
Rate Changes from Spanish Reforms. Review of Economics and Statistics, 2018. DOI: 10.1162/
rest_a_00764
7. Schmidheiny K., Slotwinski M. Tax-Induced Mobility: Evidence from a Foreigners’ 
Tax Scheme in Switzerland. Journal of Public Economics. 2018;(167):293–324. DOI: 10.1016/j.
jpubeco.2018.04.002
8. Akcigit U., Baslandze S., Stantcheva S. Taxation and the International Mobility of 
Inventors. American Economic Review. 2016;106(10):2930–2981. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150237
9. Guvenen F. et al. Offshore Profit Shifting and Domestic Productivity Measurement. NBER 
Working Paper No. 23324. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research; 2017.
10. Barro R. J. et al. How Tax Reform Will Lift the Economy. The Wall Street Journal. 
November 26, 2017. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-tax-reform-will-lift-the-
economy-1511729894
11. Furman J. Dynamic Analysis, Welfare, and Implications for Tax Reform. Remarks at the 
National Bureau of Economic Research Tax Policy and the Economy Conference. Washington; 2016.
Journal of Tax Reform. 2019;5(2):107–128
127
ISSN 2412-8872
12. Barro R., Furman J. The Macroeconomic Effects of the 2017 Tax Reform. In: Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity. BPEA Conference Drafts, March 8–9, 2018. Available at: https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/4_barrofurman.pdf
13. Ananiashvili I., Papava V. Impact of the Average Tax Rate on the Aggregate Demand 
(Keynesian Models). Bulletin of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences. 2016;6(2).
14. Ananiashvili I., Papava V. Taxes, Production Technology, and Economic Growth. Problems 
of Economic Transition. 2012;54(12).
15. Ananiashvili I., Papava V. Equilibrium and Optimal Tax Rates in the Models of 
Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply (Laffer-Keynesian Synthesis). Bulletin of the Georgian 
National Academy of Sciences. 2013;7(2).
16. Hrechko A. V. Prospects for reforming Ukraine’s tax system in the context of European 
integration. Problemy ekonomiky. 2014;(3):60–70. (In Ukr.).
17. Nohinova N. Need to reform Ukraine’s tax policy in the context of European 
integration. Naukovi zapysky Natsionalnoho universytetu «Ostrozka akademiia». Seriia «Ekonomika», 
2014;(25):141–145. (In Ukr.).
18. Iliashenko V. A. Development of the tax system of Ukraine in the conditions of European 
integration. Derzhava ta rehiony. Seriia: Ekonomika ta pidpryiemnytstvo. 2013;2(71):15–20. (In Ukr.).
19. Melnyk V. M., Koshuk T. V. Tax reforms in the context of acute shortage of fiscal 
resources: EU experience and Ukrainian realities. Ekonomika Ukrainy. 2014;(6):37–56. (In Ukr.).
20. Turianskyi Yu. Tax reform in the system of measures of anti-crisis regulation of the 
economy of Ukraine. Naukovyi visnyk NLTU Ukrainy. 2014;(24.5):315–320. (In Ukr.).
21. Borzenkova O. Tax reform in Ukraine: international experience and a review of 
promising changes. Biznes Inform. 2015;(10):354–358. (In Ukr.).
22. Paientko T., Proskura K. Corporate income taxation – selected problems and decisions. 
The case of Ukraine. Zeszyty Teoretyczne Rachunkowości. 2016:135–142.
23. Oparin V., Paientko T. Ideology, pragmatics and effectiveness of tax reform in Ukraine. 
Problemy economiky. 2017;(4):138–147. (In Ukr.).
24. Mayburov I. A., Ivanov Yu. B. (eds.) Taxes and taxation. A palette of contemporary issues. 
Moscow: UNITY DANA; 2014. (In Russ.).
25. Mayburov I. A., Kireenko A. P. Tax reforms and elections in modern Russia. Journal of 
Tax Reform. 2018;4(1):73–94. DOI: 10.15826/jtr.2018.4.1.046
26. Mayburov I. A., Ivanov Yu. B. (eds.) Taxation of natural resources. Theory and world trends. 
Moscow: UNITY DANA; 2018. (In Russ.).
27. Bakhtadzae L., Kakulia R., Chikviladze M. Taxation. Tbilisi; 2007. (In Georgian).
28. Kemularia R. Tax Reforms in Georgia. Tbilisi; 2011. Available at: https://www.imf.org/
external/np/seminars/eng/2011/revenue/pdf/rusuda.pdf
29. Kopaleishvili, T., Chikviladze, M. Taxes and taxation. Tbilisi; 2011. (In Georgian).
30. Meskhia I. Public Finance: Taxes and Budget. Tbilisi; 2012. (In Georgian).
31. Chikviladze M. The Share in Percentage of Taxes in GDP. J. Ecoforum. 2018;7(1).
32. Terashvili N. Taxes of Georgia. Tbilisi; 2015. (In Georgian).
33. Uridia G. Taxation. Tbilisi; 2017. (In Georgian).
34. Verulidze, V. Taxes and Taxation. Batumi; 2015. (In Georgian).
35. Bedianashvili G. Benchmarking as a Research Method for Obtaining System Knowledge 
of the State Institutional Development. J. Information Models and Analyses. 2017;6(1):84–89. 
36. Gaganidze G. Foreign Trade of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine with the European 
Union and After Signing the Association Agreement. J. Ecoforum. 2018;(1):6.
37. Silagadze A. Integration Economic Indicators of the EU and Some Issues of Development 
of Post-Soviet Countries – New Associate Members of the EU. Moldavian Journal of International 
Law and International Relations. 2014:33(3):78–83. 
38. Bedianashvili G. Knowledge Economy, Entrepreneurial Activity and Culture Factor 
in Modern Conditions of Globalization: Challenges for Georgia. J. Globalization and Business. 
2018;(5):32–37.
39. Papava V. Tax Federalism Concept: Consensus Versus Separatism. Georgian Economic 
Trends, 2001;(2). 
40. Shevardnadze K., Chechelashvili R., Chocheli V., Khaduri N. Papava Indexes of Tax 
Corruption. Tbilisi: Company Imperial; 2000. 
41. Silagadze A., Zubiashvili T. Parameters of the Europe Union and the Post-Soviet 
Georgia’s Economy. Refereed International Journal of Business and Management Studies (IJBMS). 
2015:441–448. 
42. Silagadze A., Zubiashvili T. Foreign Direct Investment in Georgia. International Journal 
of Arts and Science. 2016;9(2):63–72. 
Journal of Tax Reform. 2019;5(2):107–128
128
ISSN 2412-8872
43. Zubiashvili T., Chikviladze M., Silagadze N. Some Aspects of State External Debt. 
J. Ecoforum. 2018;7(1). 
44. Bilan O. Tax Reform in Georgia: Lessons for Ukraine. VoxUkraine; 2015. Available at: 
https://voxukraine.org/en/tax-reform-in-georgia-lessons-for-ukraine-en/
Authors
Givi Bedianashvili – Dr. Sci. (Econ.), professor, Director of the European University’s 
Institute for Research of Economic and Social Problems of Globalization, member 
of the Academy of Economic Sciences of Georgia (76, Guramishvili Avenue, 0141, 
Tbilisi, Georgia);  0000-0003-4521-737X; e-mail: g.bedianashvili@eu.edu.ge
Yuriy B. Ivanov – Dr. Sci. (Econ.), professor, Deputy-Director of the Research Center for 
Industrial Problems of Development of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine 
(prov. Inzhenernyi, Kharkiv, 61166, Ukraine);  0000-0002-5309-400X; e-mail: yuriy.
ivanov.ua@gmail.com
Tetiana V. Paientko – Dr. Sci. (Econ.), professor of the Finance Department, Kyiv 
National Economic University n.a. Vadym Hetman, Ukraine (54/1 Peremohy Avenue, 
Kyiv, 03057, Ukraine);  0000-0002-2962-308X; e-mail: tpayentko@kneu.edu.ua
For citation
Bedianashvili G., Ivanov Yu. B., Paientko T. V. Tax Reforms in Ukraine and Georgia: 
Changing Priorities. Journal of Tax Reform. 2019;5(2):107–128. DOI: 10.15826/
jtr.2019.5.2.063
Article info
Received June 25, 2019; accepted July 27, 2019
Информация об авторах
Бедианашвили Гиви – доктор экономических наук, профессор, директор Инсти-
тута исследований экономических и социальных проблем глобализации Евро-
пейского университета, академик академии экономических наук Грузии (0141, 
Грузия, г. Тбилиси, Проспект Гурамишвили, 76);  0000-0003-4521-737X; e-mail: 
g.bedianashvili@eu.edu.ge
Иванов Юрий Борисович – доктор экономических наук, профессор, заместитель 
директора по научной работе Научно-исследовательского индустриальных 
проблем развития Национальной академии наук Украины (61166, Украина, 
г. Харьков, пер. Инженерный, 1-А);  0000-0002-5309-400X; e-mail: yuriy.ivanov.
ua@gmail.com
Паентко Татьяна Васильевна – доктор экономических наук, профессор, профес-
сор кафедры финансов Киевского национального экономического универси-
тета имени Вадима Гетьмана (03057, Украина, г. Киев, проспект Победы 54/1);  
 0000-0002-2962-308X; e-mail: tpayentko@kneu.edu.ua
Для цитирования
Бедианашвили Г., Иванов Ю. Б., Паентко Т. В. Налоговые реформы в Украине 
и Грузии: эволюция приоритетов // Journal of Tax Reform. – 2019. – Т. 5, № 2. – 
С. 107–128. – DOI: 10.15826/jtr.2019.5.2.063
Информация о статье
Дата поступления 25 июня 2019 г.; дата принятия к печати 27 июля 2019 г. 
